Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
July 6, 2025, 6:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on July 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin’s crypto-mobilization efforts. Putin attended the “Everything for Victory” forum hosted by the People’s Front (Narodnyi Front, formerly the All-Russia People’s Front) on July 6 in Moscow City.[1] The People’s Front is a Russian Ministry of Defense- (MoD) and state-backed political coalition of non-governmental organizations and political parties largely led by United Russia. Putin created the People’s Front in 2011 when he was prime minister. The People’s Front monitors the implementation of Putin’s decrees and has increasingly served as a military assistance initiative, providing aid to Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine through its “Everything for Victory” program. The organization also includes the “Kulibin Club” drone and electronic warfare (EW) production initiative, which develops and tests technology for the Russian military. Putin claimed during his address to the forum that the People’s Front has become a mass public movement due to “the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens” who wish to defend “the life principles and values” passed down from previous generations and that the Russian military enjoys “universal, nationwide support” among the Russian population.[2] Putin highlighted the contributions that the organization has made to Russian forces in Ukraine, such as supplying 110,000 drones and more than 14,000 vehicles. Putin is likely attempting to shore up public support for the People’s Front and the war to increase voluntary recruitment among Russian citizens. Putin’s focused messaging on the Russian populace’s alleged “overwhelming” support for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin is trying to combat issues with voluntary recruitment and societal support for the war. ISW has observed indications that the Kremlin is struggling to maintain its voluntary recruitment rates.[3] ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to declaring another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and remains committed to promoting crypto-mobilization efforts.[4]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a “double-tap strike” against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggest that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 6 that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and four S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 177 drones and that 19 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian, energy, and military infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[6] Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian military registration and enlistment office in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast – the third such strike since June 30.[7] Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.[8]
Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on July 6 that Russian forces conducted two double-tap strikes targeting Ukrainian emergency responders during overnight drone strikes against Kharkiv City and after shelling against Kherson City on the morning of July 6.[9] Russia’s recent drone technological adaptations and strike tactics, such as accumulating drones near a target before simultaneously striking, have increased Russia’s ability to precisely coordinate strikes and hit intended targets.[10] Russia’s recent overnight strikes have increasingly resulted in civilian casualties, and Russia is very likely intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilians, including with “double tap” strikes likely meant to kill first responders and strikes against military registration and enlistment offices.
The Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia’s losses from the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on July 5 that Rosstat did not report demographic data in its January to May 2025 “Socioeconomic Situation in Russia” report.[11] Electoral statistics researcher Dmitry Kobak reported in late June 2025 that Rosstat refused to fulfill his request for data pertaining to 2024 male excess mortality and monthly deaths by date of death.[12] ISW previously assessed that Rosstat is concealing population data in an attempt to obfuscate Russia’s ongoing demographic problems, and the omission of demographic data in Rosstat’s reports likely also aims to obscure the Russian military’s high personnel loss rates.[13]
Key Takeaways:
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 6.
Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 5 and 6.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) directions.[15]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[16] Elements of the Arbat Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk border areas.[17]
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an aerial and naval drone strike against Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 5 to 6. A Ukrainian reserve officer and Russian opposition outlet Astra stated that Ukrainian forces conducted the combined drone strike near the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) base.[18] Astra reported that the results of the strike are unknown, and the Ukrainian reserve officer reported that preliminary geolocated footage suggests that Russian forces repelled the strike.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Sumy Oblast border area on July 5 and 6.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the Sumy direction.[20]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Arbat Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 60th “Veterany” Separate Reconnaissance Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) and drone operators of the “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[21]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on July 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 5 and 6.[22]
The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating near Vovchansk reported on July 5 that Russian forces are trying to occupy the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in northern Vovchansk and that Russian forces are constantly conducting assaults in the area at night and dusk.[23]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast border areas.[24]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 6 that Russian forces seized Sobolivka (just west of Kupyansk).[25] Select Russian milbloggers claimed that there is no confirmation of the alleged seizure, however, noting that there has been no video evidence of Russian advances in this area.[26]
Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk and north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Radkivka, and Kindrashivka on July 5 and 6.[27]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova).[28]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Novoserhiivka, and Novoyehorivka and toward Olhivka and Chervonyi Stav on July 5 and 6.[29]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Lisna Stinka (north of Borova).[30] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Novoyehorivka.[31]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 6 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) advanced south of Karpivka and west and southwest of Zelena Dolyna (both north of Lyman).[32]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Myr and toward Serednie; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 5 and 6.[33]
The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on July 6 that the Russian military command tasked Russian forces with seizing Torske by July 1.[34]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 6 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Serebryanka and south of Hryhorivka (both northeast of Siversk).[36]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on July 5 and 6.[37]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attack near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on July 5 and 6.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 6 but did advance.
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on July 5 and 6.[40]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Rusyn Yar.[41] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Malynivka and toward Razine and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivkaand Promin and toward Novoekonomichne and Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and toward Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Zvirove and toward Molodetske; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on July 5 and 6.[43]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces have shifted their focus from advancing toward Kostyantynivka by attacking in the Toretsk direction to attacking along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka.[44] Trehubov reported on July 6 that Russian forces are focusing their Summer 2025 campaign on the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions.[45]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoekonimichne.[46] Elements of the “Typhoon” Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[47]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows Russian forces raising a flag in Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 7 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[49]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of and within Myrne, west of Zirka (both south of Novopavlivka), and in Tovske (formerly Tolstoi, southwest of Novopavlivka).[50] A Russian milblogger denied Russian claims that Russian forces advanced in Tovske.[51]
Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and Horikhove; and south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Zirka, Piddubne, Myrne, and Komar and toward Tovste and Filiya on July 5 and 6.[52]
Trehubov reported on July 5 that Russian forces are not attacking in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast yet but that there is fighting near the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk Oblast administrative border.[53]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Piddubne.[54] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS and EMD) are reportedly operating near Piddubne.[55] Drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Myrne.[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 6 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near and within Voskresenka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[57]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Voskresenka, west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on July 5 and 6.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Maliivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[59]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Voskresenka.[60] Drone operators of the “Snegiri” Reconnaissance Group (37th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 36th CAA, EMD) and the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[61]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 6 but did make any confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 5 and 6.[62]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on July 5 and 6.[64]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly operating in the Kamyanske direction.[65] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and ZVENO Reconnaissance Battalion and elements of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[66]
Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on July 5 and 6 but did not advance.[67]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate near the coast of occupied Crimea.[68]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77371
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77371
[3] https://isw.pub/ForceGen060625 ; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen050725 ; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen043035 ; https://isw.pub/RussianForceGen042325
[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2024
[5] https://t.me/kpszsu/37822
[6] https://t.me/synegubov/15497 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2754 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15502 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15503; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23870; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1059667-rosia-zavdala-serii-udariv-sahedami-po-harkovu-aki-naslidki/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15497 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2754 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15502 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15503; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23870; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1059667-rosia-zavdala-serii-udariv-sahedami-po-harkovu-aki-naslidki/ ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0DKVraMwja3xBb3yz3whYyAvrN1zW1e11wjHWh1GPJvNjwkShXBRnSdgtAoM1pc34l ; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/15103 ; https://t.me/senkevichonline/13425 ; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1059775-rosijski-bpla-vlucili-v-budivlu-kremencuckogo-rajonnogo-tck-ta-sp/ ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/21747 ;https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/21751 ; https://t.me/suspilnezaporizhzhya/39422
[7] https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1059775-rosijski-bpla-vlucili-v-budivlu-kremencuckogo-rajonnogo-tck-ta-sp/ ; https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24722; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/30/vorozhyj-bpla-vdaryv-poruch-z-budivleyu-tczk-u-kryvomu-rozi-prote-zavdyaky-zahodam-bezpeky-zhertv-vdalosya-unyknuty/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/03/vorog-vdaryv-po-budivli-tczk-v-poltavi-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni/; https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24771;
[8] https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1059775-rosijski-bpla-vlucili-v-budivlu-kremencuckogo-rajonnogo-tck-ta-sp/
[9] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45562
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare
[11] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/07/05/rosstat-perestal-publikovat-dannye-o-demografii-v-rossii
[12] https://kobak dot livejournal.com/134458.html?view=comments#comments
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025
[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml
[15] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30873 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30851
[16] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30855 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30873
[17] https://t.me/wargonzo/27727
[18] https://t.me/astrapress/85777 ; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1941805992167022925
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml
[20] https://t.me/wargonzo/27719
[21] https://t.me/epoddubny/24032 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/152437 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27727
[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248
[23] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/05/dobigty-do-zavodu-pomahaty-praporom-ta-pomerty-rosiyany-ne-zminyuyut-taktyku-u-vovchansku/ ; https://t.me/vovkodavy34/39
[24] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95191
[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/54426; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95232; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65680 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30869; https://t.me/dva_majors/74807; https://t.me/epoddubny/24043
[26] https://t.me/milinfolive/152462; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171516; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38175
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248
[28] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1941648057361428853; https://t.me/Sinkovka_Kupyansk/13129
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248
[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171449
[31] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1941648057361428853; https://t.me/Sinkovka_Kupyansk/13129
[32] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38181
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248
[34] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/06/dedlajn-buv-1-lypnya-okupantam-tak-i-ne-vdalosya-zajnyaty-torske/
[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/74813
[36] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38185
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248
[38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38185
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27719
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30851
[41] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14002
[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/74798; https://t.me/dva_majors/74801
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248
[44] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1059503-boi-vidbuvautsa-u-doneckij-oblasti-duze-blizko-do-dnipropetrovskoi-na-toreckomu-napramku-znizilas-kilkist-boiv/
[45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/06/v-osuv-hortyczya-rozpovily-pro-hid-litnoyi-kampaniyi-rosiyan/
[46] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14001
[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38182
[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9526; https://t.me/voin_dv/15847; https://t.me/osintpen/1361
[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/54427
[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65672; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30851; https://t.me/wargonzo/27719
[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38176
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248; https://t.me/tass_agency/324086
[53] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1059503-boi-vidbuvautsa-u-doneckij-oblasti-duze-blizko-do-dnipropetrovskoi-na-toreckomu-napramku-znizilas-kilkist-boiv/
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38176 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171514; https://t.me/voin_dv/15847; https://t.me/epoddubny/24035
[55] https://t.me/voin_dv/15840
[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/15854
[57] https://t.me/wargonzo/27719; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30851
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248
[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65672
[60] https://t.me/voin_dv/15846
[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/15843; https://t.me/voin_dv/15849
[62] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13248; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0DKVraMwja3xBb3yz3whYyAvrN1zW1e11wjHWh1GPJvNjwkShXBRnSdgtAoM1pc34l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26326
[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/15842
[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0DKVraMwja3xBb3yz3whYyAvrN1zW1e11wjHWh1GPJvNjwkShXBRnSdgtAoM1pc34l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml
[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/74774
[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/74772; https://t.me/dva_majors/74782; https://t.me/sashakots/54742
[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gUXVPEjQWv8KLKGFCTqTTjJg7N2VKZFiuHxyvXgN1VFFJ2gkFaEC3D6rzv7enpUyl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0DKVraMwja3xBb3yz3whYyAvrN1zW1e11wjHWh1GPJvNjwkShXBRnSdgtAoM1pc34l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BTjxqUTBcUuhhrMbEUi6A4r1ZFhdAseq9n6Q6eiRMmQ2UyM53YUvpak2KH8Cm7Ml
[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/74785
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 6, 2025 – Institute for the Study of War
