Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, Angelica Evans, and George Barros
July 5, 2025, 5:20 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months. Geolocated footage published on July 4 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Koptieve and Shevchenko Pershe and advanced to southeastern Razine (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[1] Russian forces have recently seized on opportunistic advances northeast of Pokrovsk, following their focus on advances along the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka T-0504 highway since early 2025.[2] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 28 that Russian forces appear to be attacking in the “Dobropillya direction” (northwest of Toretsk and Pokrovsk) and that elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (AC) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking in the area.[3] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the Russian salient between Pokrovsk and Toretsk to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast and north or to bypass Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka from the southwest and west.[4]
The Russian units conducting these assaults have been engaged in combat since they redeployed to reinforce the Russian force grouping operating east of Pokrovsk in February and March 2025.[5] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 3 that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC) and 150th Motorized Rifle Division have been operating near Novotoretske (north of Razine) and Novoekonomichne (south of Razine) after seizing Malynivka in mid-June 2025 and recently seizing Koptieve (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[6] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic AC, SMD) are also operating northeast of Pokrovsk.[7] Ukrainian forces have been degrading these Russian units, and it is unclear whether the Russian military command intends to leverage the same units to push further north and west of Razine or if Russia may attempt to reinforce these units with additional redeployments. These Russian units will have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River to advance west of Razine, which may present another obstacle to the Russian advance depending on the river’s water level.
Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months. ISW forecasted in December 2024 that Russian forces would need to make significant advances in the direction of Rodynske (west of Razine) to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast, and the Russian forces’ recent advances near Razine cohere with this assessment.[8] The commander of a Ukrainian National Guard artillery reconnaissance battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 5 that Russian forces are focusing their attacks between Malynivka, Novoolenivka, and Popiv Yar (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in an effort to interdict Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk.[9] The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces are constantly conducting assaults with motorcycles and buggies. Russian milbloggers claimed on July 4 and 5 that Russian forces are trying to complicate Ukrainian logistics in the area by damaging a bridge near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), interdicting Ukrainian forces’ ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Udachne, and along the railway line near Kotlyne.[10]
Russian forces have largely struggled to advance southeast, south, and southwest of Pokrovsk in the face of Ukrainian drones since late 2024 and have essentially held close to the same positions in these areas since January 2025. The Russian military command may be prioritizing advances northeast of Pokrovsk in an effort to establish a stronghold in Rodynske, which could enable Russian forces to either attack Pokrovsk directly or advance toward Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) with the aim of interdicting the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad M-30 highway and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk under the threat of envelopment Russian forces could also advance north of Udachne or Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk) in order to interdict the M-30 highway if they can overcome Ukrainian defensive positions in the area, which currently seems uncertain.
Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate that Russian forces are placing a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine’s fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions — and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a head-on assault against the fortress belt. Russian forces have thus far struggled to break out of Toretsk and make significant advances from Chasiv Yar or north of the Kleban Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk), which has likely complicated the Russian military command’s original plan for an operation against Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and the wider fortress belt. The Russian military command may be adjusting its plan, and Russian forces may attempt to create a salient in the fields and small settlements between Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka in order to bypass the fortress belt from the west. Russian forces would likely have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River in several places and would have to be able to sufficiently supply troops on the west (right) bank in order to maintain such a salient. Russian forces would likely also have to seize the settlements along the Pokrovsk-Oleksandrivka (north of Dobropillya) line in order to fully interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the fortress belt. It is unclear whether the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, which is currently in charge of activity in the Pokrovsk direction, is capable of conducting such an operation with the degraded forces currently at its disposal. Russian forces are likely reaching higher levels of exhaustion and degradation after well over a year of intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Such an operation would likely be a multi-year effort with significant personnel losses and hard-fought gains, although Russian forces have proven willing to undertake such long-term operations.[11]
Such an operation would be consistent with Russia’s recent tactics and operational concepts designed to advance by leveraging smaller partial envelopments to seize territory instead of attempting rapid, deep operational-level penetrations of Ukraine’s defense, which Russian forces currently do not have the means to conduct. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command appears to be developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to leverage creeping partial envelopments of frontline towns and settlements to force Ukrainian withdrawals, based on Russian forces operational pattern demonstrated in its seizures of Avdiivka in February 2024 and Vuhledar in October 2024.[12] Russian forces have demonstrated an ability to plan and execute limited campaigns in a designated area of operations to exert and sustain maximum pressure and to mitigate the risk of overextending their forces while forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw under threat of tactical encirclement. The Russian military command is likely implementing the same doctrinal method used to seize Avdiivka and Vuhledar in its attempts to seize Pokrovsk and possibly Ukraine’s fortress belt.
Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct long-range strikes that target Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 5 that Ukrainian Forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, conducted a strike against the Russian Joint Stock Company VNIIR-Progress Plant in Cheboksary, Chuvashia Republic, on the night of July 4 to 5.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the plant produces the “Kometa” adaptive antenna arrays, which are used in Shahed drones, Iskander-K cruise missiles, KAB guided bombs, and other high-precision weapons. Geolocated footage published on July 4 shows that a Ukrainian drone struck the VNIIR-Progress Plant.[14] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on July 5 that the Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at the plant.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, also conducted a strike against the Borisoglebsk Airfield, Voronezh Oblast, and struck a KAB guided glide bomb warehouse and combat training aircraft.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces base Su-34 fighter-bombers, Su-35M fighter jets, and Su-30SM fighter jets at the Brisoglebsk Airfield. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data for July 5 shows satellite-detected heat anomalies at Borisoglebsk Airfield, including in the central part of the airport and the logistical section.[17]
Ukraine’s Western partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy announced on July 4 that Ukraine and South Korea launched a new Economic Innovation Partnership Program (EIPP) in which South Korea will allocate $10 million for the implementation of infrastructure projects in Ukraine over the next four years.[18] Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy reported that the initiative includes provisions for strategic consultations, development projects, and feasibility studies aimed at long-term economic cooperation between Ukraine and South Korea in the public and private sectors. Ukraine’s Minister of Strategic Industry Herman Smetanin announced on July 4 that Ukraine signed an agreement with Denmark that will allow Ukrainian defense industrial companies to export production to Denmark, increasing the scale and supply of Ukrainian weapons in a location where Russian forces are unable to strike Ukrainian defense industrial facilities.[19] The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) similarly announced on June 29 that Denmark is allocating 67 million euros (roughly $79 million) to accelerate the establishment of Ukrainian defense industrial companies in Denmark.[20]
European intelligence services continue to report that Russia is intensifying its deployment of chemical agents in Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans reported on July 4 that Dutch and German intelligence agencies have evidence that Russian forces are frequently employing banned chemical agents in Ukraine.[21] Brekelmans stated that Russian forces are intensifying their use of chemical agents, including using drones to drop choking agents into Ukrainian trenches to force Ukrainian soldiers into the line of fire. The Dutch and German intelligence agencies reported that Russian forces are normalizing and standardizing the use of chemical agents, such as tear gas and chloropicrin, along the frontline and that Russia is investing in chemical weapons research.[22]
Key Takeaways:
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 5.
Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 4 and 5.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Bezsalivka (southwest of Glushkovo along the international border in northern Sumy Oblast) and Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[24]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) direction.[25]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in the Sumy Oblast border area on July 4 and 5.[26]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian facilities in Konotop (northwest of Sumy City) with a Geran-2 (Shahed-variant) drone.[27]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th and 83rd airborne (VDV) brigades reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[28]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on July 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke, Zelene, and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 4 and 5.[29]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz “Bati” Detachment (204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[30] Elements of the Russian 380th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reconstituted Soviet unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City).[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced marginally in southwestern Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[32]
Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 4 and 5 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Milove (north of Kupyansk along the international border) and west of Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk).[33]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Radkivka, and toward Kutkivka and Kolodyazne, and along the international border near Milove and Chuhunivka on July 4 and 5.[34]
A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on July 4 that Russian forces seized Milove and the surrounding forest areas and are likely preparing to attack Bolohivka or Odradne (southeast of Milove) in the near future to support their efforts to create a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.[35] The source stated that Russian forces have not launched a large-scale offensive operation near Milove and are trying to attack toward Zarubnka (west of Milove) and Ambarne (south of Milove).
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 5 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[36]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Nadiya and Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 4 and 5.[37]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Novyi Myr, and Kolodyazi; northeast of Lyman near Torske and Myrne; east of Lyman near Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 4 and 5.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 4 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub.[39]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on July 5 that Russian forces are transferring unspecified units from other directions to the Lyman direction.[40] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have roughly two divisions’ worth of soldiers operating in the Lyman direction and that Russian forces recently attempted a mechanized assault in this direction.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Serebryanske forest area northeast of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[41]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 4 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[42]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Siversk.[43]
Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Dariivka and Vyimka on July 4 and 5.[44]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[45]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued assaults south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on July 5.[46]
One Russian milblogger questioned recent claims that Russian forces seized Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[47]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[48]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Toretsk direction on July 5 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and southeastern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[49]
Russian forces continued assaults near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and toward Pleshchiivka; west of Toretsk near Katerynivka and the Kleban-Byk Reservoir; southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Yablunivka on July 4 and 5.[50]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[51]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 4 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck a command post of the Russian 8th CAA and another command post of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[52]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: See topline text for reports of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.
Russian forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, Novoekonomichne, Novotoretske, Razine, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Novoukrainka, and Zvirove; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on July 4 and 5.[53]
Order of Battle: Elements of the “Maksim Krivonos” Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Piddubne, seized most of Tovste (formerly Tolstoi), and advanced east of Novokhatske (all southwest of Novopavlivka).[55]
Russian forces continued assaults near Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Komar, and Myrne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zirka and Tovste on July 4 and 5.[56]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka).[57] Drone operators of the Russian “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near Tovste.[58]
Russian forces continued assaults in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that additional elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) advanced southeast of and into Voskresenka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[59]
Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Voskresenka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on July 4 and 5.[60]
A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction reported that Russian forces are using yellow or blue tape to disguise themselves from Ukrainian forces.[61] ISW previously noted that these deception tactics may amount to acts of perfidy — a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[62]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 5.[63]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Kamyanske and northeast of Stepove (both southwest of Orikhiv) and in southwestern Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[65]
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky and toward Novoandriivka on July 4 and 5.[66]
A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated that Russian forces have been accumulating manpower and intensifying drone operations around Kamyanske in recent weeks.[67] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces have been unable to gain a foothold on the right bank of the Yancherkrak River along the floodplains but noted that Russian forces could more easily advance toward Zaporizhzhia City if they seize Kamyanske.[68] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported that Russian forces are replenishing their units in the area up to 90 percent and are intensifying their attacks.[69] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have shifted their tactics in the Orikhiv direction and are attacking in mixed teams of two well-armed and trained soldiers to clear positions and then follow up with less-trained infantrymen to consolidate positions.
Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction, including near the Antonivsky Bridge, on July 5, but did not advance.[70]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kherson direction reported that Russian forces are intensifying their use of small boats in the area, but that Ukrainian forces are repelling Russian landing attempts.[71]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[72]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 4 and 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 322 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 157 drones and that 135 were ”lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian drones primarily targeted Starokostyantyniv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck residential, civilian, and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.[74]
Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Russia is using Chinese-made mounts in recently-launched Russian Shahed-type drones to support catapult launches.[75] Ukrainian military-focused outlet Militarnyi reported that Russian forces use catapults to deploy large numbers of drones more efficiently.[76] The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) willingness to manufacture and sell drone components to the Russian military indicates deeper military cooperation amid the PRC’s increasingly evident role in Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9524; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1032664728983257 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9522; https://t.me/skala425/622
[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2025
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2025
[7] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2842
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024
[9] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1059421-armia-rf-rozvivae-placdarm-v-trikutniku-naselenih-punktiv-malinivka-novoolenivka-popiv-ar-komandir-divizionu/
[10] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171423 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30813
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125
[13] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26299
[14] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1941374542091518102; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1941406738156294166
[15] https://t.me/astrapress/85667 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/strike-drones-hit-vniir-progress-production-workshop-in-cheboksary/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/85670
[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26273 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/syly-oborony-vdaryly-po-aerodromu-z-rosijskymy-sushkamy/
[17] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1941401119781196181; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1941365634153189850 ; https://t.co/i4S6uT90cJ
[18] https://suspilne dot media/1058965-pivdenna-korea-ta-ukraina-zapocatkuvali-novu-programu-ekonomicnogo-partnerstva-pogodzeno-persij-trans-u-10-mln/ ; https://me.gov dot ua/News/Detail/c0428306-2b5a-4946-afdc-3c9ed4e2d8cb?lang=uk-UA&title=RespublikaKoreiaZapochatkovuNovuProgramuEkonomichnogoInnovatsiinogoPartnerstvaZUkrainoiuNa10-MlnDol
[19] https://t.me/herman_smetanin_msp/688; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/04/ukrayinski-oboronni-kompaniyi-vidkryyut-vyrobnycztva-v-daniyi/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1058617-ukraina-vidkrie-virobnictvo-zbroi-v-danii/
[20] https://www.fmn.dk/en/news/2025/new-agreement-opens-the-door-for-ukrainian-defence-companies-to-produce-in-denmark/
[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-use-chemical-weapons-against-ukraine-widespread-dutch-defence-minister-2025-07-04/
[22] https://english.defensie.nl/latest/news/2025/07/04/russia-further-intensifies-its-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-ukraine
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl
[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30836 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74717
[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30822
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl
[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/323951 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54395
[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30822
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5820
[31] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171391
[32] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29443; https://t.me/Ochi151/110
[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95153; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95128
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196 ; https://t.me/rybar/71921 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13544
[35] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22116
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30832
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30807
[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/zi-svoyih-mertvyh-znimaly-shtany-lutaly-yih-konkretno-pro-povagu-u-rosijskomu-vijsku/
[41] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1941524843859718564; https://t.me/specnazahmat/1452
[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9523; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1941197789587009847; https://t.me/osirskiy/1206
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38170 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30838
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/54387
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298
[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/27697 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30822
[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30831
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30831
[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14000
[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vhwAHJqg2Ce2ERxwE7FjEpDKzRsiNAceiuQpdKByTc9wreo9pJ83SnbuYwegd76Ul
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171373
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30823 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74717
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/15826
[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171408
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30830 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15826 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15839
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13196
[61] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/05/nadyagayut-antydronovi-plashhi-ta-sidayut-na-motoczykly-vijskovi-pro-dyvnu-taktyku-rosiyan/ ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1059177-do-dnipropetrovskoi-oblasti-vijska-rf-ne-dijsli-situacia-u-zoni-vidpovidalnosti-31-ombr-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku/
[62] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925 ; https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-37
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298
[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/15834
[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/74717; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95134
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95134 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74717 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27697
[67] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1058945-rosijski-vijska-prosunulis-v-kamanskomu-na-zaporizzi-mikula/
[68] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1058945-rosijski-vijska-prosunulis-v-kamanskomu-na-zaporizzi-mikula/
[69] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/vidpravlyayut-pid-nis-zsu-yakshho-prosyat-rotacziyu-osoblyvyj-pidhid-armiyi-rf-do-svoyih-soldativ/
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26298 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26260 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JjhCZk8yNv2pX1BM8othqL6KqMFL3wYTE29WCBYaj34P69sFYMFxLifW58Wgsc3Fl
[71] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRTENAVO8mo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/forsuyut-terytoriyu-na-malyh-chovnah-rosiyany-aktyvizuvalysya-na-prydniprovskomu-napryamku/
[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/54392
[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/37750
[74] https://t.me/khmelnytskaODA/5654 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15489 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/okupanty-vdaryly-po-chuguyevu-shahedom-postrazhdala-dytyna/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15490 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/05/harkivshhyna-palaye-12-aviaraket-i-ponad-30-droniv-atakuvaly-oblast/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22709 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/04/u-kryvomu-rozi-8-postrazhdalyh-poshkodzheno-bagatopoverhivky-gotel-i-navchalnyj-zaklad/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22706 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/04/vorog-znovu-vdaryv-po-kryvomu-rogu-ye-postrazhdali-j-poshkodzhena-infrastruktura/
[75] https://www.facebook.com/SecurSerUkraine/posts/pfbid02JH3fAHyxrd8CDZ7mXBsDucnRRKJgw95nhRhuLcni8dubotrgyimEu4yQnBYTKeuol?__cft__[0]=AZWGUUeYU6fmMjDqbw9hdhu6wBQH2raqBCibOWjtTg9z63R7th3tOUJVLIWuFZCAe9ijx6EdjOee3oYby6niKprfh-N3zuZLHEe6TZB89UIAQvWa4lEtlfObYjhZtMNd6zrPTa14cCAGNkb2JpqC-kXf8_a1w0y64ruFyudlg7s9ag&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[76] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-launches-shaheds-using-chinese-made-catapult-mounts/
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 5, 2025 – Institute for the Study of War
