“US forces are not in Europe to protect Europeans,” says Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Ben Hodges. “You cannot defend the United States from Texas or North Carolina or Florida only,” said Hodges, former Commanding General of US Army Europe (2014–2017), when asked about the role of US military bases on the continent. “You have to have forward presence to project air, sea, and land power, not just in Europe, but into Africa, the Middle East, and the Arctic.”
In a Q&A with the Center for European Policy Analysis, Hodges outlines the strategic functions that make US bases in Europe critical, explains what the United States risks if it scales back its presence, and reflects on what’s often overlooked about America’s forward military presence.
CEPA: Which US bases in Europe do you consider most critical for military operations on and beyond the continent?
Hodges: Firstly, as we look at bases that the US uses across Europe, every administration always discusses whether or not to expand or hand over. It should be based on a strategic analysis that says: here’s our priorities, here’s our resources, here’s what we need. It could be just a purely budget-driven process, but you still should be thinking about what risk you are taking and what you would lose. Because once you hand over a base, you’re not likely to get it back.
The second thing is that, of course, we don’t need what we used to have. We had almost 300,000 troops during the Cold War, mostly in West Germany, Italy, and Turkey. We don’t need that anymore. It’s a different environment. Almost all of those bases have been turned over.
The third thing to keep in mind is access. You cannot defend the United States from Texas, North Carolina, or Florida only. You have to have forward presence and forward capability to project air, sea power, and land power into Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, as well as Central and Eastern Europe and the Arctic. You can’t do all that from US bases back in the continental United States.
And, of course, these are not free. There are different arrangements on who pays for what, but allies don’t have to let us do this. We can’t just assume that we’re going to put a naval base in Italy or Greece and that they have to accept it. These are sovereign nations, and I think there is a level of arrogance sometimes by the US about what we can and can’t do.
You need trust. You’ve got Status of Forces agreements. It’s different with each nation, but if you have a US base in Germany, for example, we’ve worked out the agreement with German authorities for what happens if a soldier is in a car wreck, gets in trouble, or has tax issues. That’s part of the base; it’s not just the real estate.
Intelligence sharing is also a big factor. Besides Five Eyes [intelligence alliance with the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand], we have strong intelligence sharing and bilateral agreements with countries like Germany and Poland. Our intelligence capabilities are not just based on American satellites, they’re also based on these agreements. And those satellites are worthless if you don’t have enough ground stations, which we have inside European countries. They might not count as bases, but it’s still a US presence that we need.
There’s also no value in having a base with troops just sitting there if they’re not able to train or do maintenance. If you want to have real capability, large or small, they have to be able to train and maintain readiness.
Which bases are really critical? We have such a small footprint in Europe, and we only have one of everything. If you take away a particular base, you are either going to lose that capability, or you’re going to wedge it into some other place that’s already at full capacity.
And, of course, you need headquarters to manage everything. The job of US Army Europe, just like US Army Africa or Central or Pacific, is to set the theater. That headquarters connects us to intelligence networks, the logistics networks. You know what has to go where so that when there is a crisis and big US forces come to Europe, somebody already knows where everything’s going. The setting of the theater is an important part of that. Most of the headquarters and bases we have in Europe are part of that theater army.
CEPA: How do you think the closure of air and naval hubs like Ramstein, Sigonella, and Souda Bay might impact US force projection in Africa and the Middle East if these were to close?
Hodges: You could forget dominating the Mediterranean or being able to project power into Africa if you don’t have the access that we get from Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. Most of the US Navy in Europe is based in Rota, Spain. The headquarters is in Naples. And we have Crete. That’s an important part of the Navy’s ability to protect our interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. If you take out one, just know that you have less capability. The distances, maintenance, fuel, and all the stuff required to do what they do are based on having these airports and seaports.
If you want to have sea power in the Mediterranean to help protect our interests, you have to have a presence. And in order to keep a US Navy ship or anybody’s ship underway, it has to have a place for maintenance and fuel. This is not like you just pull up into a gas station, get filled up, and keep moving. This is huge money, and you have to have existing contracts and the maintenance when the ship pulls in. It’s a pretty complex set of things that have developed.
CEPA: What is the importance of the Eastern flank for overall US security? If the missile defense systems in Poland and Romania were to close, what global threats would become more challenging for the US to counter?
Hodges: The ability to get there for deterrence. Deterrence requires capability and credibility — your adversary has to see what you have and believe you’ll use it. If we’re not present, that adds to the challenge, because you have to move there, get enough stuff there, and move as fast or faster than Russian forces, for example.
That’s a challenge right now, which is why we brought back the Army Preposition Stock, in Europe, equipment for an armored division stored in Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Mihail Kogălniceanu (MK) Airbase, for example, in Romania, has developed over the last 10 years as a power projection platform into the Black Sea because of the airfield there, but also the troops that are there, the headquarters, the maintenance, the contracts, all of that. That’s the best place on the Black Sea for the United States. It’s also where NATO’s Black Sea air police mission flies from.
It would leave a huge hole for the United States if we left MK. Now, of course, it’s a Romanian base. We are a tenant there. The French or the Brits could be there. I don’t know how that helps advance America’s interest, but the capabilities could eventually be replaced by another ally. In Poland, of course — where it sits on the map — being there with our Polish allies, right in the middle of where, if there was going to be a Russian attack somewhere, US forces could respond, be based at the V Corps headquarters in Poznan. It’s there to provide the leadership, command, and control for all the US forces on the Eastern flank. If you close that down, then you’ve got to come up with another way to provide that.
CEPA: Given the shift in focus on the Indo-Pacific, how do you see the role of the US bases in Europe evolving in response to this change in strategy?
Ben Hodges: I think it’s to be expected. Going back to President Obama, they wanted to shift out to the Pacific more. And then, of course, Russia had different plans. Russia invaded Ukraine, and we had to stop. It’s interesting to me that all the stuff that Russia has done happened after the US downsized, handed over bases, sent all the tanks home, and reduced our ability to deter and defend because we thought we’d never have to do this again. We thought it was over.
Personally, I’m always going to be uneasy about taking out too much because we already know what happens. But we don’t have unlimited resources. If the administration makes the strategic decision to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region, which is legitimate and is the prerogative of any administration to do that, then they have to start looking at, okay, what do they cut?
I don’t know this for a fact, but my guess is that what gets cut first will be the rotational forces because that’s a lot of money. They use assets that already exist in Poland, Germany, and Lithuania. So if they’re cut, we’d lose capability, but you wouldn’t necessarily have to get rid of bases. If the Army as a whole, as I think it is going to happen, is going to take a major cut, then for sure, US Army Europe will be a billpayer. But because there’s only one of everything, one signal brigade, one artillery brigade, one air defense battalion, one combat striker unit, one airborne, one aviation, if you get rid of any of those, that’s a capability that’s gone. But I’d have to say that everything is on the table here.
CEPA: How do you think Russia and China would interpret US-based closure and troop withdrawals from Europe?
Ben Hodges: Firstly, they would have to go order cases of champagne to celebrate. You could only interpret it as less priority. Then they would watch to see whether Europe could fill that gap, or if the US does something to mitigate that risk. Keeping in mind that US forces are not in Europe to protect Europeans. They’re there for our strategic interests.
So, the Russians and Chinese would interpret this as okay; America either does not have as much strategic interests in the region, or the US can’t protect or doesn’t care. And none of those are good signals to send to the Russians. The Chinese may say, okay, the US is finally doing what it said it was going to do, which is to put more emphasis on the Pacific. But there’s not much that we have in Europe that would move to the Pacific. The capabilities in Europe are not necessarily the things, with some exceptions, that are needed in the Pacific from the army. So, the administration would have to be asking Europe to protect our interests.
CEPA: Is there anything else you think is misunderstood or overlooked when discussing these bases in Europe?
Hodges: I think it’s always been a challenge to keep congressional support for bases overseas because there’s no benefit to any congressman or senator for their state. They want troops in Texas, North Carolina, Georgia, Kansas, etcetera, instead of overseas. They were always happy to have rotational forces because we could protect interests overseas, but the families and all the money was still spent back home. Even so, most of Congress has always understood the importance of NATO and American presence in Europe and supported it for decades.
I’m afraid that as our presence in Europe gets smaller, the language from the administration downplays the importance of our European allies. Less people appreciate the benefit of forward presence in Europe and how we benefit from intelligence sharing and access.
There’s always talk about the Arctic. There are several NATO allies in the Arctic, and you can’t replace that by seizing Greenland. It’s having the presence that the UK allows us to have, Iceland allows us to have, or Norway. It’s those relationships, the intangible things, that’s what gets lost here. And it’s harder to explain unless you have a feel for it.
Interview conducted by Mila Tange of CEPA’s editorial staff
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Military experts explain why US bases in Europe matter.
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