US-China trade war is on: Could it turn violent, and when? – Responsible Statecraft

The far bigger threat from Trump-China tariffs is a sharp escalation in ongoing security tensions that could easily turn into something else
Today Trump suspended his global trade war with all countries except China. This confirms that, even as all eyes were on the chaos in the financial markets, the far bigger threat from Trump’s “liberation day” was a sharp escalation in the US–China conflict that could now plausibly turn violent within the next couple years.
Prior to Trump’s “liberation day” the two countries had an unhealthy relationship with steadily building pressures toward conflict. The Biden administration not only retained almost all of the first Trump administration’s antagonistic measures against China but expanded and intensified them. Though it eventually revived the diplomatic exchanges that the first Trump administration shut down, Biden declined to work with China to mitigate the zero-sum forces pushing the two countries against each other.
The new Trump administration quickly imposed a sharp increase on China’s already high tariffs. Yet both sides were initially willing to seek an agreement that could have at least reduced tensions. After the election, Beijing sent a series of delegations to Washington in hopes of understanding what kind of concessions Trump was seeking and how to get talks started. It informally suggested a range of issues on which it could give ground, ranging from currency valuations to guarantees on dollar centrality to industrial investment in the United States.
Trump, for his part, heaped praise on Xi Jinping — “he is an amazing guy” — and repeatedly teased an early meeting between the two. In February he suggested that the United States, Russia, and China enter nuclear arms control talks that could eventually lead to all three cutting their military spending by half. As I argued recently, far from deceit or misdirection, Trump’s whole worldview and mode of reasoning supported the potential for such dealmaking.
That potential is now gone. Instead the U.S. and China have embarked on an escalatory spiral that could lead to disaster for both.
On liberation day, Trump announced that China’s penalty for unfair trading would be an additional 34% increase in tariffs on top of the existing average 42%. At such high rates, few Chinese products would still be competitive in the U.S. market. More significantly, this latest attack convinced the Chinese leadership that the Trump administration is simply uninterested in negotiations and is instead seeking to humiliate China and wreck its economy.
In contrast to its limited response to earlier tariff increases, China has now decided to fight back. It imposed an across-the-board 34% increase on U.S. exports, hitting some $143.5 billion of revenue for American companies. It also placed new restrictions on exports of some strategically important minerals, added some U.S. companies to its list of unreliable businesses, and announced an anti-trust investigation into DuPont.
In its official response, the Chinese government positioned itself as defender of the globalization status quo. It characterized the U.S. aim as “using tariffs to overturn the existing international economic order, placing U.S. interests above the common good of the international community, and sacrificing the legitimate interests of other countries in service to American hegemonic interests.”
The government cast itself as calm and dignified but resolute in the face of an irrational and aggressive United States: “We do not start trouble, but we are not afraid of it either.” A statement placed in People’s Daily reassured the Chinese people on the economy’s resilience and promised significant fiscal support to expand domestic economic demand and government action to help businesses weather the turmoil.
Trump responded with equal resolve but with none of the calm or dignity, posting: “CHINA PLAYED IT WRONG, THEY PANICKED – THE ONE THING THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO DO!”
He then chose the nuclear option, raising tariffs on China an additional 50% starting today. China said it would match that further increase tomorrow. In his tirade postponing liberation day for other countries, Trump tacked on an additional 21% increase. In total, since the start of Trump’s term, the United States has now raised tariff rates by 125% and China by 84%.
In line with the president’s post, conventional wisdom in Washington is that China’s economy is so fragile it has no leverage in the economic conflict. Cut off from the U.S. market, they think, China will simply flood other exports markets and alienate Europe, Japan, and the Global South in the process.
Such overconfidence may lead to serious miscalculations as the fighting intensifies.
China has indeed been struggling since 2021 with a slow collapse of its huge real estate bubble and the uneven transition to a new structure of growth, leading to high youth unemployment and persistent deflationary pressures. It has a huge trade surplus that needs to find an outlet.
But Chinese economic policymakers have considerable space for fiscal stimulus to increase domestic demand if they choose to use it. Up to this point they have refrained because they were trying to maintain momentum on their agenda of structural economic reforms. Faced with the emergency of international conflict, they are likely to open the spigots.
Trump, in contrast, may have pulled back from his economic offensive on the whole world but he has not repudiated it. That means the U.S. economy and economic relations with other trading partners face a period of debilitating uncertainty that could cause considerable damage. China’s growth may surge even as the U.S. faces rising inflation and slowing growth.
The United States and China now find themselves locked in confrontation. The main force restraining economic warfare up to this point was simply the failure of American measures to undermine the Chinese economy. We have now blown past that condition.
Where might the conflict go from here? The most likely outcome of a hard decoupling between the U.S. and Chinese economies is terrible disruption to global supply chains. Many companies will simply shut down, but large smuggling networks will also emerge as Chinese producers seek access to the American market and American producers cast about for crucial inputs that are suddenly gone. Some Chinese production will move to the Latin American countries largely spared on liberation day.
That will set the stage for further escalation. The United States will seek to suppress smuggling. China will target strategically important goods to deny them to American producers. Both sides will start to lean on third countries to maintain their influence, giving rise to the possibility of proxy conflict. Most concerning, both sides increasingly will be tempted to impose pain on the other by striking more directly at their national security sensitivities.
China’s general practice is to meet each escalation from the United States with a proportionate response. It also has strong incentives to avoid unhinged reactions since it wants to use aggressive American measures against other countries to shore up diplomatic relations in the region and with Europe.
The same cannot be said of the Trump administration. Trump himself seems fixated on extracting a performance of submission to which Chinese leaders will never acquiesce. As his frustration mounts — and particularly if the Chinese economy does prove resilient to his assault — he will become more and more receptive to the national security team he built. In contrast to his own instincts, Trump’s top military and economic advisers are almost without exception committed to confrontation with China.
The reported contents of the Pentagon’s Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance suggest how easily economic warfare could slip toward military conflict. Defense Department leaders may seize on the collapse in U.S.–China relations to pursue the crash military buildup in Asia they have defined as “the cardinal objective of US grand strategy”.
Such a course was destabilizing even when the Biden administration pursued it alongside attempts to establish guardrails limiting conflict. In a context of mounting economic pain on both sides, with surging nationalism in both countries becoming a binding force on leaders, both governments are likely to choose more destructive responses to what they regard as provocations from the other side.
A single misstep around Taiwan or in the South China Sea could end in catastrophe.

Some of President Donald Trump’s key foreign policy initiatives have not been gaining traction with most Americans, according to the results of a new survey released Tuesday by the Pew Research Center.
Majorities of the more than 3,600 respondents who participated in the poll said they opposed Trump’s suggestions that Washington should take over Greenland and Gaza, while pluralities said they disapproved of his closing of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and leaving the Paris Climate Agreement to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
A 52% majority of respondents said they also opposed Washington’s departure from the World Health Organization. Thirty-two percent said they approved of leaving both the WHO and the Paris agreement.
A 43% plurality said Trump was favoring Russia “too much” in his efforts to end the war in Ukraine, while a plurality of nearly a third of respondents (31%) said he was favoring Israel “too much” in its conflict with Palestinians. (In the latter case, 29% said Trump was “striking the right balance,” while 3% said he was favoring Palestinians. Thirty-seven percent said they weren’t sure.)
The survey, which was conducted between March 24-30, preceded the imposition by the Trump administration of across-the-board tariffs on foreign imports and the outbreak of what appears to be an escalating trade war between the United States and China. Most respondents (52%), however, predicted that tariffs on Chinese exports would have a “bad” impact on the U.S., while only 24% said the impact would be “good.”
There were major partisan differences on that question, however, with 44% of Republican or GOP-leaning respondents saying that tariffs would have a “good” impact and 24% “bad.” On the other hand, a whopping 80% of Democrats or Democratic-leaning respondents predicted the tariffs on China would have a “bad” effect on the U.S. economy, while only five percent said they would be “good” for the U.S.
Asked how the tariffs on Chinese goods would affect them personally, however, a plurality of Republicans (30%) said the impact would be “bad,” while only 17% predicted the impact would be “good.” Overall, respondents were about five times as likely to say increased tariffs on China will be bad for them as they were to say they would be beneficial.
The partisan divide also emerged with respect to the other questions raised by the survey. For example, strong majorities of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents said they approved of ending most USAID programs (64%), leaving the Paris agreement (60%), and leaving the WHO (58%). The comparable percentages for Democrats or Democratic-leaning respondents were 9%, 7%, and 8%, respectively.
Similarly, 13% of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents said the Trump administration was favoring Israelis too much, while 50% of Democrats or Democratic-leaning respondents took that position.
And while 28% of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents said they either “strongly oppose” (16%) or “somewhat oppose” the U.S. taking over Greenland, Democrats or Democratic-leaning respondents were far more hostile to the idea — 70% strongly opposed, and another 11% said they “somewhat opposed” the idea.
As for age differences, older respondents were generally more likely to approve of Trump’s early foreign policy actions than younger respondents.
Top Image Credit: Where To Cut Pentagon Waste?
The Trump administration’s new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) claims it’s out to cut wasteful government spending. A new video by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft asks: why not start with the Pentagon?
“The Pentagon is the largest government bureaucracy. It employs nearly 3 million people, has an annual budget of $850 billion — and has never once passed the audit,” says Ben Freeman, director of the Quincy Institute’s Democratizing Foreign Policy program.
Indeed, the Pentagon is infamous for wasteful projects. “At the very top is the F-35: it's the most expensive weapons program in world history. Ultimately, it's going to cost taxpayers around $1.5 trillion — and for what? It doesn't work, it’s overpriced and overdue,” explains Freeman.
And what about all that under-used and even unused space the Pentagon owns, in particular, its military bases in the U.S.? They are ripe for cutting.
Also deserving of scrutiny are Washington's many weapons contractors, which receive about half the Pentagon’s annual budget— over $400 billion annually — through extensive congressional lobbying, and an infamous revolving door between leaders in the weapons industry and government alike.
“We've heard too many stories about waste, fraud and abuse in Pentagon contracting. They're overcharging for spare parts, toilet seats, hammers, you name it,” Freeman says. “Taxpayers are paying too much for the things our troops need. We know there's wasteful spending at the Pentagon and we're not really doing anything about it. That costs American taxpayers money, and that makes all of us less safe.”
To learn more about how DOGE could cut the Pentagon’s wasteful spending, watch the video:

Reports this week, based on satellite footage and witness testimony from IDF soldiers, reveal that Israel has carved out a nearly one-mile deep "buffer zone" inside Gaza along the border with Israel. Almost all economic and residential infrastructure within this region has been demolished and Gazans living and working in the area have been forcibly relocated.
Israel’s ongoing conquest of the Gaza Strip, the expulsion of Palestinians residing there, and the re-establishment of Israeli settlements are the principal parameters defining the new map created by the blood and fire of the Second Palestine War.
Israeli policies for the future of Gaza and its 1.8 million inhabitants based upon this foundation have been most enthusiastically embraced by Israel’s resurgent rightwing.
But they also resonate with an Israeli public forced to confront the unfinished business of the century-old conflict.

Whatever their differences, Israeli and Palestinian leaders recognize that sooner or later, for better or worse, the fate of hostages and prisoners will be decided.
As important as the resolution of this issue is, the broader contest between Israel and Palestine is of even greater and lasting magnitude. Not only the fate of individuals, the destiny of peoples and nations are in the balance. Without a sober appreciation of this fact, the current dispute over hostages loses its defining context.
The magnified attention awarded to this issue is also reflected in plaintive demands for Israel to define its plans for the so-called “day after.” These calls are easily parried by an Israeli government less concerned about addressing legitimate questions about its intentions than in forging a path to victory. The Netanyahu government has found a fast friend for this approach in the new administration in Washington.
While the dogs bark, Israel continues to pursue the destruction of Hamas as a political and military/security factor, an objective that has, from the war’s outset, defined victory in the campaign that Israel is waging.
Underlying this broad military-security objective, however, are even greater, indeed existential if not always articulate imperatives, born of a century of competition between Palestinians and the Zionist movement for the national identity of Palestine.
Revenge is the first and foremost strategic policy objective, defining Israel’s conduct of the war and indeed its very purpose. For the Hamas movement itself, one need look no further than an abiding, incessant desire for retribution, all but divorced from sober political calculation, to explain its actions.
For Israelis dumbfounded by the assault of October 7, vengeance provides the vital political foundation upon which popular support for the war is being waged.
Hamas’ brutal assault forces Israelis to acknowledge that Palestinians remain unwilling to be reconciled to the results of the First Palestine war. Gaza, chock a block with families enduring generations of national trauma, has always been the most active source of its national movement.
The Israeli public, in turn, supports a policy of reprisals against the Gaza for the latter’s stunning success in calling into question the holy of holies in the Zionist pantheon – that Jewish settlement, protected by the IDF, establishes the basis for personal security and protection of Israeli state-building.
The ferocity of Israel’s campaign aims not only at burning defeat into Palestine’s national and political consciousness, but also convincing Israelis as well that its founding principles remain sacrosanct and credible instruments of national policy.
Since the early 1950s, a Palestinian “Return” to homes lost in Israel has been unachievable — all but unthinkable. Indeed, the iron law underpinning Israel’s conduct of the First Palestine War — that Palestinians must pay with territory and sovereign control for any effort to challenge Israel, also defines a key Israeli strategic objective in the war now being waged in Gaza.
Israel’s conduct of the Gaza war and its humanitarian aftermath make clear its abiding intention to make certain that Palestinians will not even be permitted to dream of “Return.” Indeed, when Palestinians in Gaza (or Jenin) dream of going “home” today, it is not to Ashqelon or Ramla, but rather to all but obliterated refugee camps in Jabaliya and Beit Hanoun.
If Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump have their way even this forlorn aspiration will be denied them.
Minister of Security Israel Katz official pointedly explained in February that Israel’s approved entry of “a very limited quantity” of mobile shelters and heavy equipment into Gaza “does not affect the feasibility of implementing Trump’s voluntary migration plan or creating a new reality in Gaza, which Prime Minister Netanyahu is fully committed to.”
Moreover, Katz said the IDF will move to clear areas “of terrorists and infrastructure, and capture extensive territory that will be added to the State of Israel’s security areas.”
These “security areas” now comprise about a third of Gaza’s territory and a large percentage of Gaza’s agricultural and employment capacity.
The Trump administration’s extraordinary endorsement of large-scale Palestinian transfer and its ongoing effort to win Arab support for it, has raised the profile of an option long considered taboo outside of a right-wing Israeli minority.
In an April 2 address, Netanyahu reflected the change in policy that the White House endorsement has produced. Israel’s policy, he declared, would be defined by four elements — Hamas’ complete demilitarization and the expulsion of its leadership, complete Israeli security control over Gaza in its entirety, and the realization of Washington’s plan for large-scale transfer of Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip.
The dramatic developments produced by the war have empowered Israeli proponents of Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip. The IDF, by establishing sovereign security control over Gaza, including its most productive agricultural areas along the perimeter with Israel, is creating the security infrastructure for a “return” …of Israeli civilian settlement.
As bizarre as this option seems, the purpose and utility of Jewish settlement in Gaza fit neatly into Israel’s national experience. Palestinian attacks upon Israel have always been met with demands for a “Zionist response” — Jewish settlement — whether in Hebron or the hills of Samaria. And now Gaza.
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s evacuation of all Israeli settlements and their population of 7,000 in 2005 appeared to have ended the prospect of settling the Gaza Strip. An aging Sharon was pursuing the creation of a new security paradigm. But the re-entry of the IDF into Gaza 18 months ago destroyed this model. It has instead energized the intense lobby behind the re-establishment of civilian settlements in Gaza in order to realize both nationalist and security objectives.
Proponents remain a vocal and influential minority, but even their opponents acknowledge the extraordinary success of the settlement movement in the West Bank in the decades since the conquests of June 1967.
Israel’s conquest of Gaza has broken many taboos, but then again so too did the Hamas assault on October 7. Whether Israel stands guilty of the charge of genocide, it is certainly the case that it is pursuing a policy of “politicide” — aimed at destroying for all time any Palestinian hope for sovereignty west of the Jordan River.
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